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ABSTRACT
Islamic financial institutions have relied for decades on margin-based contracts to 
provide financing for the business sector, despite the basic idea that Islamic finance 
is expected to provide an equity-based or a profit and loss sharing (PLS) contract. 
This fact raises the need to encourage the use of a margin-based instrument with an 
innovative scheme that allows for conversion of the contract into a PLS-based contract. 
Moreover, we propose a convertible ijarah contract to fill this need. A convertible ijarah 
contract is an ijarah (rent) contract that is convertible to a PLS contract according to 
the Islamic financier’s decision. In this study, we simulate three scenarios of project 
financing with (a) murabaha as a margin-based contract, (b) musharaka as a PLS 
contract and (c) a convertible ijarah contract. The aim is to evaluate whether the 
convertible ijarah contract will provide a higher return for the financier compared to the 
other contracts. The main input of the simulation is nine sectors of Indonesian SMEs’ 
financial performance. We found that when the financial performance of Indonesian 
SMEs was measured by short-term financial performance, the convertible ijarah 
contract outperformed the murabaha contract for all sectors but did not outperform 
the musharaka contract, except for low-margin sectors. However, when the financial 
performance of Indonesians SMEs was measured by long-term economic performance, 
we found that the convertible ijarah contract outperformed the  murabaha contract and 
musharaka contract for almost all sectors.
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I. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Background
1.1.1. Basic Feature of Islamic Finance: PLS
The basic feature of Islamic finance is to replace interest rates with profit and loss 
sharing (PLS) or an equity participation system (Iqbal & Molyneoux, 2005; Khan, 
1986; Warde, 2000). Aggarwal and Yousef (2000) stated that proponents of Islamic 
finance argue that profit-sharing contracts (equity) are superior to debt contracts 
for a variety of reasons, including the risk-sharing properties of equity and the 
promotion of economic growth by providing long-term financing to growth-
oriented sectors of the economy. However, even though Islamic banking has been 
operating for five decades, their practices are still not in line with the ideal form 
based on a PLS or equity participation system. Islamic bank operations deviate in 
terms of the substance of the contract and the pricing of financing (Anwar, 2003; 
Chong & Liu, 2009; Hutapea & Kasri, 2010). Many Islamic scholars have tried 
to explain this deviation phenomenon. One of the most accepted reasons is the 
financial market’s asymmetric information environment, in which Islamic banks 
operate (Khan, 1986; Roy, 1991; Warde, 2000; Azmat, Skully & Brown, 2015). A 
bank is a highly risk-averse financier. The presence of asymmetric information 
makes banks prefer debt to participation or equity as a financing choice, and this 
holds true in the case of Islamic banks (Azmat et al., 2015).
1.1.2. Asymmetric Information 
Asymmetric information results in adverse selection and moral hazard problems. 
The adverse selection problem refers to a condition in which a financier seeks a 
good project but adversely finances a bad project. The adverse selection problem 
arises due to a lack of private information regarding the prospect or risk of the 
project (Carlier & Renou, 2006). The adverse selection problem causes credit 
rationing, especially for borrowers who do not have enough assets to use as 
collateral (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981), and spurs unproductive investments (De 
Meza & Webb, 1997). Meanwhile, moral hazard may occur when asymmetric 
information causes change in the behavior of the contracting parties in the form 
of misreporting (Carlier & Renou, 2006; Azmat et al., 2015) and excessive risk 
taking (Azmat et al., 2015). However, the theoretical model developed by Azmat 
et al. (2015) showed that the moral hazard problem is not as severe as the adverse 
selection problem, since the moral hazard problem can be neutralized using long-
term relationships or punishment strategies.
1.1.3. The Need for Innovation is Islamic Financing Scheme
The deviation of Islamic banking operation from the ideal form around the 
world raises the need to seek other institutions to provide financing that is more 
compliance with the conceptual framework of Islamic finance.  Such an institution 
should be an equity-based financier. The capital market is an equity-based source 
of financing, but it cannot be accessed by small and medium-sized firms (SMEs). 
There is another kind of equity-based financier called venture capital firms. A 
venture capital market is an equity market in nature and is less risk-averse than 
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banks. In many cases, a venture capital firm is willing to invest in high-risk start-
up firms that only have new product ideas. The objective of a venture capital firm 
is to add value through learning and innovation (Bergemann & Hege, 1998) so that 
the venture capitalist can sell their share later at a high price. They usually also 
provide the venture with organizational, managerial, and technological assistance 
and industry networking (see Gompers & Lerner, 2001; Guler & Guiller, 2010) to 
increase the venture’s chance of success. A venture capital firm usually aims to 
reach the harvest time for selling the venture at the initial public offering (IPO); in 
many cases, ventures are even sold to investors prior to the IPO. In sum, venture 
capital financing has a positive impact on entrepreneurship, innovation (Ueda, 
2004), job creation (Schmidt, 2003; Paglia &Harjoto, 2014), and thus the growth 
and development of the economy (Vergara et al., 2016).
Adapted from existing venture capital firms’ operation, Islamic finance 
might develop Islamic venture capital firms. Al Suwailem (1998) stated that the 
arrangement of venture capital financing appears very close to musharaka model 
financing, a type of PLS-based financing. However, Islamic venture capital needs to 
develop financing schemes that comply with Islamic sharia rules and are workable 
in the market.  Islamic venture capital is expected fill this need, provide financing 
for SMEs, spur invention and innovation, create jobs and ultimately contribute to 
economic growth. 
In providing funding for start-ups, venture capital firms commonly provide 
convertible debt or convertible preferred stock financing. These contracts will be 
converted into equity if a project succeeds and the venture capital firm converts it 
into equity or shareholdings. Kaplan and Stomberg (2004) found that convertibles 
account for 90% of all start-up financing contracts in United States. Convertible 
securities provide an opportunity for venture capital firms to carefully assess the 
prospects and risk of the project as well as the trustworthiness of the entrepreneur 
before making a decision regarding whether the business will be further financed 
or liquidated (Ozerturk, 2008). 
Based on studies described previously, we propose a convertible ijarah 
contract for PLS-based of Islamic business financing. This contract is adapted 
from convertible contracts provided by venture capital firms. A convertible ijarah 
contract here refers to an ijarah (rent) contract with the option to be converted 
into a musharaka or equity contract by an Islamic venture capital firm. An ijarah 
contract is an asset rent contract, where the financier acquires an asset needed for 
business operation and leases it to an entrepreneur for a period with a scheduled 
rent payment. It is assumed that in the period of the ijarah contract, the financier 
would be able to collect any information regarding prospects and risks of the 
project and the integrity of the entrepreneur. This information reduces information 
asymmetry between the financier and the entrepreneur, thus reducing the adverse 
selection problem. After a thorough evaluation along the period of ijarah (i.e., 
rent), the Islamic venture capital firm can decide whether the project is feasible 
to finance further with equity or PLS scheme. The Islamic financier would then 
convert the contract into musharaka if the project shows a high growth potential, 
stay in the ijarah contract if the project has only moderate returns, or even liquidate 
the assets if the project fails. This convertible contract is expected to increase equity 
or PLS-based Islamic financial institution financing, especially Islamic venture 
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capital financing. Using this scheme, Islamic financiers are expected to increase 
their profitability. 
In terms of Sharia, there are currently two statements (fatwa) of the Indonesian 
National Sharia Board (Dewan Syariah Nasional, DSN) that might be used as a 
basis for the discussion about the endorsement possibility for the convertible 
ijarah contract proposed here. These are (a) Fatwa number 49/DSN-MUI/II/2005 
about Conversion on Murabaha and (b) Fatwa number 59/DSN-MUI/V/2007 about 
the Convertible Mudharaba bonds.
1.2. Objective of the Study
This study aims to evaluate the economic feasibility of the convertible ijarah 
contract proposed here. Specifically, it seeks to answer the question of whether it is 
feasible to provide this contract for Indonesian SMEs. This is crucial because SMEs 
account for more than 98% of all Indonesian business firms and provide more than 
95% of Indonesia’s employment. The analysis was conducted using a simulation 
method. Simulation was chosen because there are no data on the convertible 
ijarah contract. We designed the simulation by making three contract scenarios 
for SME financing. These are the murabaha contract, musharaka contract and 
convertible ijarah contact. The question we posed is whether providing financing 
with a convertible ijarah contract would result in better performance compared 
to financing with a murabaha contract and financing with a musharaka contract.
The main input of the simulation is the financial performance of Indonesian 
SMEs for the period of 2004-2010. These data were generated from Indonesia’s 
central bank. Indonesian SMEs are here divided into nine categories based on 
Indonesia’s central bank’s categories. The Indonesian SMEs’ financial performance 
was measured by the operating cash flow rate (OCFR) and the cash recovery 
rate (CRR). OCFR is a short-term profitability measure, while CRR is a long-
term economic measure. There are 343 SMEs involved in nine sectors. We used 
these data to generate each sector’s ‘future data’ of Indonesian SMEs’ financial 
performance using Monte Carlo simulation or bootstrapping, which produced 
10,000 points of data for each sector.
The rest of this paper is divided into five parts. Part two presents a literature 
review on the deviation of Islamic banking operations from the profit and loss 
sharing (PLS) system and review of venture capital and convertible contracts, 
followed by the construction of the conceptual framework for the convertible ijarah 
contract in part three. The research methods are detailed in part four, while the 
discussion and analysis will be provided in part five followed by the conclusion. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1. Islamic Banking Deviation from PLS System 
Iqbal and Molyneoux (2005) stated that the basic feature of Islamic finance is to 
replace interest rates with a profit and loss sharing system (PLS) on both the asset 
(financing) and liability (savings) sides of the balance sheet. PLS on the financing 
side will lead capital allocation to be closely linked with economic growth, while 
PLS on the liability side will lead the income distribution of the society to be 
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aligned with financial institution performance. PLS on both sides will encourage 
distributive justice and prevent a wide income gap in society. 
In practice, Islamic banking operation deviates from this system. Islamic banks 
around the world rarely provide financing based on the PLS system. Aggarwal 
and Yousef (2000) found that Islamic bank financing deviates from the ideal 
scheme in three ways. First, PLS financing is rarely employed; instead, Islamic 
banks generally rely on murabaha contracts in financing, despite the fact that 
these contracts resemble a standard debt contract. The most notable feature of 
the standard debt contract is that repayment does not vary under a wide range of 
circumstances, as it does with the murabaha contract. According to Anwar (2003), 
45-93 percent of Islamic banking financing is murabaha compared to PLS for only 
1-17 percent of mudharaba and 1-20 percent of musharaka. This phenomenon is 
called “murabaha syndrome” by Youssef (2004). Second, Islamic bank financing is 
biased to short-term financing, while only a minimal portion involves long-term 
financing. Third, financing tends to be ‘secured’ by requiring collateral over the 
asset acquired through financing Anwar (2003) skeptically stated that the change 
in the Islamic banks is more of a change in the form of the contract, without a 
fundamental change in the operations of the Islamic banks that confuse the public.
Another phenomenon that confuses the public is the pricing process of Islamic 
banks.  Chong and Liu (2009) stated that the yield (or investment rate) of Islamic 
bank deposits was not interest free, but closely pegged against conventional bank 
interest rates on deposits. Moreover, the short-term dynamics indicate the mean 
reversion rate of the investment towards the long-term equilibrium level. This 
finding was reinforced by Hutapea and Kasri (2010), who found that the yield 
of Islamic banks is closely related to conventional bank interest rate fluctuations, 
while Ariss (2010) concluded that there is no significant difference between the 
profitability of Islamic banks and conventional banks, and Farook (2012) found 
that Islamic banks were proven to perform management profit distribution to 
savers.
A number of reasons have been proposed to explain why Islamic bank financing 
practices deviate from the ideal scheme. Roy (1991) mentioned that Islamic banks 
could not apply the rule of Sharia because they are constrained by the need to 
compete with conventional banks that operate within the interest rate system. This 
competition has led to Islamic banks using margin-based financing to provide 
competitive returns for depositors. Furthermore, Khan (1986) mentions that the 
interest-based contracts currently used in conventional banks have evolved over 
several centuries and operate in an asymmetric information environment. As a 
result, Islamic banks that operate in the same asymmetric information environment 
will operate ‘very closely’ to the techniques used by conventional banks. Azmat 
at al (2015) stated that the presence of information asymmetry requires Islamic 
banks to select a mode of financing that will minimize their risk, and why debt-like 
products dominate Islamic banking assets. 
Financial markets do not operate like other goods and services markets. There 
is no equilibrium in financial markets due to the asymmetrical information (e.g., 
Arkelof, 1970; Stiglitz &Weiss, 1981). Carlier and Renou (2006) divided asymmetric 
information into two types of problems, the adverse selection problem and the moral 
hazard problem. De Meza and Webb (1990) defined adverse selection as a problem 
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that arises because the ability of the bank to assess a project is lower than that of 
the entrepreneur seeking capital. The adverse selection problem occurs when a 
lender is evaluating a financing proposal.  Every lender wants to provide financing 
for entrepreneurs that have a good project (i.e., a project with high profitability 
and low risk) and want to avoid bad projects. During the proposal evaluation 
process, information related to the prospects and risks of a project might be highly 
asymmetric between the lender and borrower, which lead to a situation in which a 
poor project might actually get financing, and vice versa.  Carlier and Renou (2006) 
defined the adverse selection problem as ex ante asymmetrical information, a 
condition in which each lender and borrower has a different private opinion about 
the possible outcome of a risky project. Differences of opinion can be in the form of 
differences in ownership of private information or simply differences in subjective 
beliefs even with the same ownership information. The other type of asymmetric 
information, in the form of the moral hazard problem, arises after financing is 
granted and repayment does not settle completely due to untrue reporting or 
uncontrollable entrepreneur efforts. Thus, the adverse selection problem refers to 
the ability to pay and the moral hazard problem refers to the willingness to pay. 
2.2. Venture Capital Financing 
Al Suwailem (1998) suggested to developing Islamic venture capital to encourage 
PLS or equity based financing. He stated that the arrangement in venture capital 
financing appears to be very close to that of musharaka model financing. However, 
developing PLS-based financing (mudharaba or musharaka) in Islamic venture 
capital needs extensive work, both from the theoretical and compliance with Sharia 
side and from the practical side. Durrani and Boocock (2006) argued that there 
are two primary reasons that justify the need for Islamic venture capital. First, 
the low state of economic development in the Muslim world increases the need 
for technological innovation and entrepreneurial assistance. The development 
of Islamic venture capital firms should fill this need and might become a vital 
contributor to a long-term strategy of economic growth. Second, it is believed 
among Islamic scholars that venture capital finance has its roots in the Islamic 
world, especially in the concept of mudharaba and musharaka. This financing 
scheme provides support to those who have entrepreneurial skills but lack 
financial resources. 
A venture capital firm is a type of financial institution providing funds 
for businesses seeking capital. It holds a portion of equity stake in the venture 
financed to gain a high cash flow when business is successful. When banks become 
lazy in evaluating projects based on their future prospects (see Manove, 2001), 
venture capital firms deliberately seek high future prospect projects and evaluate 
the funding proposals. Venture capital firms often provide funding for start-ups 
that entail high risk and high information asymmetry. Most venture capital firms 
aim to either bring the venture financed to initial public offering (IPO) or sell the 
venture for a high profit before the IPO. Thus, venture capital firms put forth any 
effort needed to bring about success for the project or the venture. Venture capital 
firms work more than pure financial intermediaries. They usually provide the 
venture with organizational, managerial, and technological assistance as well as 
industry networking (see Gompers & Lerner, 2001; Guler & Guiller, 2010).
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The venture capital industry has played an important role in spurring 
innovation and entrepreneurial activity in the US. Bergemann and Hege (1998) 
mentioned that among the advantages of venture capital firms’ financing is the 
process of learning and innovation. The learning process increases the chance the 
project will succeed in the next period, while the innovation process increases 
the marginal return of the additional financing provided. Bank lending to small 
firms in the US has been constant or even fallen since 1977, whereas venture 
capital investment was almost 100 times larger in 2001 than it was in 1977 (Ueda, 
2004). Moreover, Kortum and Lerner (2000) found that even though the R&D of 
venture capital in the USA during the 1983-1992 periods was less than 3 percent, 
it contributed more than 8 percent of industrial innovation. According to Schmidt 
(2003), while venture capital funding accounts for only a tiny fraction of the total 
corporate investment in the US, its impact on the economic growth and the creation 
of new jobs is dramatic. Moreover, Paglia and Harjoto (2014) summarize several 
studies reporting the performance of VC-backed firms to non-VC-backed firms. 
VC-backed firms have significantly higher revenues, employment growth rates, 
and higher operating efficiency due to better screening and monitoring. Vergara et 
al. (2016) highlighted the importance of VC in the entrepreneurship and economic 
growth process. They stated that VC industry has played a key role in provide 
financing for entrepreneurs in United States. Companies such as Google, Intel, 
FedEx, Apple and Microsoft, among others, are US public companies that were 
backed by venture capital firms. These VC-backed companies provide 38 percent 
of total employment, account for the 63 percent of total market capitalization and 
spend 85 percent of total research and development. 
2.3. Previous Studies on Convertibles in Venture Capital Financing
Venture capital firms often use convertible securities (convertible debt or 
convertible preferred stock) for financing start-up firms. Convertible debt or 
convertible preferred stock generally will be converted into common shares when 
the business is successful. Petersen and Rajan (1995) stated that start-up firms 
tend to have high cash flow prospects but low actual cash flows. With convertible 
securities, investors are willing to accept a low (or even negative) cash flow in the 
early stages of the business cycle, as they expect to get a high cash flow in the future. 
Empirical study on financial contracting by Kaplan and Stromberg (2004) found 
that convertible contracts account for over 90 percent of all financial agreements 
in their sample start-up firms. A convertible contract combines debt and equity 
financing with a conversion feature that gives the claimholder (lender) the right 
to convert the debt into company equity with specified terms. This conversion 
feature can be superior to pure debt, pure equity, or mixed financing due to high 
information asymmetry. Ozeturk (2008) argued that the business strategic action 
employed by entrepreneurs determines the riskiness of the venture payoff. The 
conversion into equity may prevent the entrepreneur from defaulting strategically 
and walking away from the venture. Schmidt (2003) showed that convertible debt 
gives efficient investment incentives when the entrepreneur and investor move 
sequentially in a double moral hazard type of problem.
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2.4. Conceptual Framework of Convertible Ijarah Contract
There are several kinds of margin-based or debt-like contracts in Islamic finance, 
such as murabaha and ijarah. A murabaha contract is an arrangement for selling 
an asset or goods with a non-cash payment. The financier charges a margin on the 
asset cost for the sale. The buyer pays the full price with a serial payment for a 
given period. A murabaha contract is commonly described as cost plus financing. 
Meanwhile, an ijarah is a rent contract. The financier here buys an asset and rents 
it to the entrepreneur for a period with a certain rent payment. The most important 
difference between murabaha and ijarah is the ownership of the asset. In a 
murabaha contract, the ownership has been moved to the buyer as stipulated by 
the contract. However, in an ijarah contract, the ownership of the asset stays with 
the financier. Thus, in a murabaha contract, the financier has no right to convert it 
into another, whereas such conversion is possible in an ijarah contract. 
The convertible ijarah contract proposed here has several characteristics. The 
nature of this contract is business project financing with a profit and loss sharing 
(PLS) scheme. At the first stage, financing is provided in the terms of the ijarah 
(rent) contract. This rent period provides an opportunity for the financier to 
accumulate information about the prospects and risk of the project, as well as to 
collect information related to the entrepreneur such as the effort he has put in 
the business, his competence and also his credibility. Many of these are difficult 
to estimate based on hard information on financial statements provided before 
the funding was granted to the project. A financing contract is an incomplete 
contract, typically meaning that the effort level and strategic decisions of the 
entrepreneur cannot be define clearly when the contract is signed by the parties 
(Aghian &Bolton, 1992; Lacker, 2001; Ozeturk, 2008). However, effort levels and 
strategic decisions are crucial to determine the success or failure of the project. The 
process of information accumulation does not necessarily mean that the project 
may have better prospects but rather that assessment process will reduce the 
valuation gap between the financier and the entrepreneur regarding the actual 
prospects and risks of the project. The ijarah (or rent) period will also reveal the 
efforts and strategic decisions of the entrepreneur. This information accumulation 
thus reduces the adverse selection problem of PLS or equity based financing such 
as musharaka contract financing. If the thorough examination during the ijarah 
(rent) contract concludes that the project has good prospect for funding in the 
PLS scheme, the financier would execute his right to convert the contract into a 
musharaka or equity contract.
The convertible ijarah contract proposed here has several features:(1) the 
financing is for real assets or a long-term investment, (2) the conversion terms are 
predetermined, and (3) the asset acquired functioning as an inside collateral. 
The first feature of the convertible ijarah contract proposed here typically 
involves financing for real assets or a long-term firm investment. This might 
involve capital budgeting project providing fixed assets needed for business 
operation, or it might be financing for a start-up firm. Financing for a long-term 
investment is the main source of a firm’s future long-term cash flow. It should 
be noted that the financing contracts undertaken could not be securitized to be 
traded in the financial market. An Islamic financial institution, as the financier of 
the project, still bears the risk until the exit time of financing. For this reason, the 
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financier should evaluate the financing decision primarily based on the prospects 
and risks of the project.  
The second feature of the contract is related to the terms of the convertible 
contract. The conversion terms and condition of the convertible ijarah contract are 
established clearly at the signing of the contract or are predetermined. There are at 
least three conversion terms and conditions: (a) the timing of the conversion right’s 
applicability, (b) the form of the contract after conversion (i.e. muhasraka or equity 
stake), and (c) the profit and loss sharing ratio or equity share of each party after 
conversion is executed. For example, it might be stated that the conversion rights 
can be exercised after six months and that the stake ratio of the financier and the 
entrepreneur is 40 percent (: 60 percent after conversion) and so on. The financier 
into a musharaka or equity stake contract can convert this ijarah contract. Both 
of these instruments are forms of PLS justified in Islam with different maturity 
features. The musharaka contract provided by Islamic banking has a maturity 
time, while an equity stake contract has no definite maturity date. However, an 
exit strategy is essential for a venture capital firm, meaning that the two can be 
regarded as similar contracts in term of their maturity.
The third feature is inside collateral. In an ijarah (rent) contract, the Islamic 
venture capital firm acquires an asset and rent it to the entrepreneur for the 
economic useful life of the asset. The ijarah contract here is similar to a financing 
lease commonly found in a conventional contract, with a transfer of ownership 
at the end of the contract. However, before the whole rent period is completed, 
the asset still belongs to the Islamic venture capital firm. There is no transfer of 
property rights at the beginning of the contract. This feature provides inside 
collateral for the Islamic venture capital firm. In the event that the project fails 
and the rent payment is defaulted, the financier might rent the asset to another 
entrepreneur or liquidate the asset and receive cash from the liquidation. This 
feature provides some of protection against default risk. If the financier requires 
higher collateral, then it will only ask for the difference.
III. METHODOLOGY
3.1. Simulation Method
This research aims to evaluate the economic feasibility of convertible ijarah 
contracts to be used by Islamic venture capital firms or to improve PLS-based 
financing in Islamic financial institutions. A convertible ijarah contract is a type of 
contract that is not currently used by Islamic financial institutions. This research 
employed a simulation method due to lack of convertible ijarah contract data in 
order to achieve the goals of the research. Brooks (2008) defines simulation as an 
approach of creating a new model that resembles the functioning of a system. In a 
simulation method, the researcher will be able to act as a true scientist conducting 
experiments in a controlled situation. The simulation method enables researchers 
making experiments to determine how changing one factor or aspect while other 
aspects are unchanged will change the result. Simulation methods are increasingly 
popular in research when there is lack of empirical data or when a data-collection 
process might be very costly or need an excessive time to generate. Kleijnan (1995) 
gives an example of how it might be almost impossible to obtain the data for some 
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studies, such as a study of the effects of a nuclear war. In these circumstances, only 
a simulation method is feasible.
The simulation here is used to calculate the possible return that would be 
generated by Islamic financiers provide funding for Indonesian SME using three 
contract scenarios: They are murabaha as a margin-based contract, musharaka 
as a direct PLS contract, and the convertible ijarah contract. The financing return 
is measured by the internal rate of return (IRR), which is defined as a discount 
rate that would equate the present value of expected cash flow generated from 
financing, as shown in the following equation (See Bodie, Kane and Marcus, 2014): 
(1)
CFi here refers to future cash flows that would be received as a result of 
financing (or investment) in a project made on the initial period (initial outlay, IO). 
The internal rate of return (IRR) reflects the annual yield (rate of return) from the 
project. The IRR criterion considers cash flows that are related to the project for 
the whole period. This is a common criterion to evaluate a proposed investment 
or a capital expenditure project of a firm, along with the net present value (NPV) 
criterion. An advantage of the IRR criterion is that it can be directly compared to 
the cost of capital to carry out the investment. 
Cash flow received by a financier is dependent on the financial performance of 
the SME and the type of contract used in each of the three scenarios. The financial 
performance of the SME is generated from empirical data for 2004-2010. The 
financial performance of a project will be measured by the operating cash flow 
rate (OCFR) or the cash recovery rate (CRR) of the firm. OCFR is a short-term 
financial performance or profitability measure, while CRR is a long-term financial 
or economic performance measure (Andrews, Rue and Volkan, 2010). OCFR is 
measured as:
(2)
and CRR is measured as:
(3)
OCFR and CRR in this research refer to the concept proposed by several 
researchers to measure the long-term economic performance of a firm using ex 
post data (e.g., Ijiri, 1978, 1979; Salomon, 1982, 1985; Stark, 1987; Taylor, 1999). 
DA exp is depreciation and amortization expense, net is net of tax, NWC is net 
working capital, and R&D is research and development expenses.
Moreover, the Islamic financier would receive different cash flows from the 
same project if the financing was provided through different types of contracts. 
As a result, the IRR from a project would also differ depending on whether the 
project is financed using the murabaha contract, the musharaka contract or the 
convertible ijarah contract.
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3.2. Convertible Ijarah Contract Model Building and Assumptions 
The simulation model built in this research contains several assumptions relating 
to (1) the time period of financing, (2) collateral value, (3) the benchmark price of 
Islamic financing, (4) categorization of project performance, (5) decision criteria 
for conversion, and (6) stability of the project’s performance.
The first assumption is related to the time of financing. It is assumed that there 
are two financing periods with three important time points in the development 
of the model building of the convertible ijarah contract. The convertible ijarah 
contract is assumed to take place at three time points, namely (i) t = 0, when the 
contract is signed by the parties; (ii) t = 1, when the project profit or cash flow is 
realized and the conversion right is applicable; and (iii) t = 2, the exit time, or the 
end of the project. At time t = 0, the contract agreed upon in the early forms of the 
contract is an ijarah contract. The amount of financing is based on the value of the 
assets acquired, and the Islamic financier sets the margin assuming the contract 
will remain in the form of ijarah until all payment is completed. The contract occurs 
with high asymmetrical information regarding the profitability and risk of the 
project, while the competence and the effort level of the entrepreneur as project-
specific factors (idiosyncratic factors) are unknown. However, industry growth 
opportunity (systemic factor) is assumed to be known by the financier. Based on 
the industrial systemic information, if the project is assumed to have high growth 
opportunities, then the Islamic financier is willing to provide financing and both 
parties agree to enter the contract. The financier would refuse to provide funding 
for a project without high potential future growth. 
The second assumption is related to the collateral value of the project.  Here, 
it is assumed that the collateral is 120 percent of the amount of financing and that 
this comes from assets acquired plus other assets provided by the entrepreneur. 
This assumption was taken from interviews with several Islamic bank employees. 
The collateral value assumption is relevant to simulate the IRR for a murabaha 
contract and for a convertible ijarah contract. The third assumption is related to 
the benchmark price for financing. We assume here the equivalent of an effective 
annual rate for a murabaha contract of Indonesian Islamic commercial banks as 
the benchmark. This is an effective rate comparable to conventional Indonesian 
banking lending rate. The rate used for the simulation is generated from Indonesian 
Islamic commercial banking data for the year 2010, published by the Indonesian 
financial service authority. The equivalent rate is 14.31 percent.
The fourth assumption involves categorizing the financial performance of 
a project. We categorize a high-performance project as one that realized OCFR 
or CRR higher than the benchmark rate, a failed or default project as one that 
realized OCFR or CRR lower than zero and an average performance project as 
one that realized OCFR or CRR between these two extremes. The fifth assumption 
is related to the criteria by which the Islamic financier would make decision at 
t=1. The decision is dependent on the type of the contract being used and the 
financial performance of the project financed. First, if the project was financed 
using a murabaha contract, the Islamic financier has the decision of whether to 
stay in the contract or to liquidate the asset. It is assumed that the Islamic financier 
would stay in the murabaha contract when the project is categorized as high 
performance or average performance, whereas if the project is categorized as a 
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failure, the Islamic financier is assumed to liquidate the asset. Second, if the project 
was financed using a direct musharaka contract, the Islamic financier has to stay in 
the contract, regardless of the performance of the project. Finally, if the project is 
financed using a convertible ijarah contract, the Islamic financier has three choices: 
to convert the contract into a musharaka contract, to stay in the ijarah contract 
or to liquidate the asset. The Islamic financier assumed to convert the contract 
for a project categorized as high performance, stay in the ijarah contract for a 
project categorized as average performance, and liquidate the asset for a project 
categorized as a failure. 
The last two assumptions are related to the stability of the financial performance 
of the project and the monitoring cost of the financing. For simplicity, here it is 
assumed that the financial performance of the project for the first period (or from 
t=0 to t=1) is exactly the same as the financial performance for the second period (or 
from t=1 to t=2). In other words, the OCFR or the CRR and the cash flow generated 
from a project are the same for both periods. We ignore monitoring costs for this 
study.
3.3. Example of a Contract Performance (IRR) Calculation 
Suppose there are three independent projects proposed for financing at t=0. The 
three projects– project A, project B and project C – need an investment or initial 
outlay of $1,000 each. After making a thorough evaluation, an Islamic financier is 
assumed to agree to provide financing for all three projects. Now, the financier 
may choose any type of contract as a financing arrangement – a margin-based (M) 
contract, a direct musharaka (S) contract or a convertible ijarah (K) contract – for 
all three projects. After the first period or at t=1, the performance of each project is 
known, measured by the operating cash flow rate (OCFR): 22 percent for project A, 
10 percent for project B, and -8 percent for project C. Because the OCFR of project 
A is higher than the benchmark rate of 14.3 percent, it is categorized as a high-
performance project. Because the OCFR of project B is positive but lower than the 
benchmark rate, it is categorized as an average-performance project. While project 
C is categorized as a failure because the OCFR of the project is negative. The type 
of contract that was chosen at t=0 would affect to the different decisions that need 
to be taken by the Islamic financier at t=1. First, when the projects are financed 
with a murabaha contract (M), at time t=1 the Islamic financier is assumed to stay 
in the murabaha contract for project A (categorized as high performance) and 
for project B (categorized as average performance) but to liquidate the asset for 
project C (categorized as a failure). Second, when the projects are financed with a 
direct musharaka contract (S), at time t=1 the financier has to stay in the contract, 
regardless of the performance of the project. Third, when projects are financed 
with a convertible ijarah (K) contract, at time t=1 the Islamic financier is assumed 
to convert the contract for project A (categorized as high performance), to stay 
in the ijarah contract for project B (categorized as average performance) and to 
liquidate the assets for project C (categorized as a failure). Every decision will lead 
to a different cash flow received by the Islamic financier. For instance, from project 
A, the financier will receive a cash flow of $609.7 (if it uses a murabaha contract), 
a cash flow of $220 (if it uses a musharaka contract) or a cash flow of $143.1 (if 
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it uses a convertible ijarah contract and the contract was converted to PLS). The 
cash flow of $143.1 at t=1 from the convertible ijarah contract comes from the 
ijarah part for the first period that reflects the financing price benchmark of 14.3 
percent, as described before.  Meanwhile, from project C, which is categorized as 
a failure, the Islamic financier will liquidate the asset (if the contract is a murabaha 
or a convertible ijarah) and a receive cash flow of $1,000, reflecting the financing 
provided without any return, or it will receive zero if the contract is a direct PLS. 
At time t=2, the Islamic financier will receive a cash flow that depends on the 
type of contract employed, the performance of the project and the decision that 
was taken at time t=1. The Islamic financier will receive nothing from project C, 
which was liquidated at t=1 (if the contract is a murabaha or a convertible ijarah) 
or will receive $846 (if the contract is a musharaka). The cash flow received from 
a musharaka reflects a loss sharing from the project in the amount of $154 ($1,000 
- $846). Detailed information regarding the cash flow provided by each type of 
the contract for each project at time t=1 and t=2, along with the IRR calculation for 
each, is shown in Table 1. 
Table 1.
Example IRR Calculation for Each Type of Contract
Project OCFR (%) Category
Margin Based Contract (M) 
Performance
Direct PLS Contract (S) 
Performance
Convertible Ijarah Contract 
(K) Performance
Decision 
at t=1
CF1 CF2 
IRR 
(%)
Decision 
at t=1
CF1 CF2 IRR Decision 
at t=1
CF1 CF2
IRR 
(%)
A 22 High Stay 609.7 609.7 14.31 Stay 220 1,220 22% Convert 143.1 1,220 17.84
B 10 Average Stay 609.7 609.7 14.31 Stay 100 1,100 10% Stay 609.7 609.7 14.31
C -8 Fail Liquidate 1,000 0 0 Stay 0 846.4 -8% Liquidate 1,000 0 0
average 9.50% Average 8.00% Average 10.70%
OCFR: Operating Cash Flow Rate, CF: Cash Flow, IRR: Internal Rate of Return
Based on the example calculation above, the Islamic financier will generate a 
different average IRR from all projects depending on the different type of contract 
employed at t=0. The Islamic financier will generate a 9.5 percent return by using 
a murabaha contract, an 8 percent return by using a direct musharaka contract, or 
a 10.7 percent return by using a convertible ijarah contract.  
We use the above procedure to simulate the average return from all sectors 
of Indonesian SMEs. We used 10,000 points of data for each sector of Indonesian 
SMEs, generated from Monte Carlo simulations or bootstrapping based on 
empirical data on SMEs in each sector. 
3.4. Observation and Simulated Data
The main input for the simulations in this study is the financial performance of 
Indonesian SMEs for 2004-2010, measured by operating cash flow rate (OCFR) 
and cash recovery rate (CRR). The financial performance of Indonesian SMEs is 
included in unpublished data of the Indonesian Central Bank, but the data were 
presented for another internal research study conducted for the central Bank. 
An SME is defined here as a firm with average annual sales of less than Rp50 
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billion (US$ 4,000,000). There are 343 SMEs from nine sectors included in the data. 
The observed data for each sector vary from 17 firms (mining sector and utility 
sector) to 66 firms (business services sector). We used these data sets to generate 
each ‘future data’ sector of Indonesian SMEs’ financial performance using Monte 
Carlo simulations or bootstrapping. If the original observed data set is normally 
distributed, we used Monte Carlo simulation. When the original observed data are 
not normally distributed, we used the bootstrapping method after exclusion of any 
outlier data (see Brooks, 2008) The Monte Carlo simulations and bootstrapping 
resulted in 10,000 points of data for each of the ten data sets, with the first data set 
reflecting all SMEs data while the next nine data sets reflect sector data.
IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
Table 2 shows the statistical distribution of the financial performance of Indonesian 
SMEs, for both observed data and simulated data. Financial performance was 
measured by short-term performance (OCFR) and long-term performance (CRR). 
Table 2.
The Statistical Distribution of the Financial Performance of Indonesian SMEs 
Measured by OCFR and CRR, Observation and Simulated Data 
No Sectors
 Observed 
data
Financial Performance : OCFR Financial Performance : CRR
DGP
Observation 
data
Simulated data 
(10.000 data each)
DGP
Observation 
data
Simulated data 
(10.000 data each)
Avg SD Avg SD Avg SD Avg (%) SD (%)
(%)  (%) (%) (%) (%)  (%)
1 All Data 343 BS 19.33 15.8 19.34 15.76 BS 8.76 19.02 8.72 18.97
2 Farming 20 MC 14.23 12.27 14.12 12.28 MC 2.65 17.5 2.61 17.55
3 Mining 17 MC 31.1 22.52 31.04 22.5 MC 13.97 20.64 13.95 20.55
4 Industry 31 MC 18.45 10.89 18.53 10.86 MC 15.45 19.51 15.42 19.48
5 Utility 17 MC 13.37 10.47 13.36 10.74 MC 5.64 22 5.62 22.08
6 Construction 55 BS 22.83 16.7 22.9 16.51 MC 10.07 20.41 10.08 20.39
7 Commerce 50 MC 19.83 12.7 19.81 12.81 MC 10.38 14.93 10.34 14.95
8 Transportation and Communication 55 MC 22.44 17.43 22.4 17.45 MC 12.62 18.08 12.64 17.7
9 Business Services 66 BS 14.25 14.46 14.21 14.47 BS 2.77 20.36 2.77 20.27
10 Social Services 30 MC 15.62 13.23 15.61 13.25 MC 5.61 15.03 5.57 15.14
DGP : Data Generating Process; MC = monte carlo simulation; BS = bootrapping
Table 2 shows that the distribution of the data generated using Monte Carlo 
simulation or bootstrapping is quite close to the observed data. For instance, 
the first row shows that the average OCFR from all SME data (consisting of 
343 firms) is 19.33%, while the average OCFR of the simulated data (consisting 
of 10,000 data points from the bootstrapping process) is 19.34%. Moreover, the 
standard deviation of the observed data is 15,80%, while the standard deviation 
of the simulated data is 15.76%. The next columns show that that average CRR 
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from all SME data (consisting of 343 firms) is 8.76%, while the average CRR of the 
simulated data (consisting of 10,000 data points from the bootstrapping process) is 
8.72%. The other data sets show similar figures. 
Next, we calculated the cash flows produced from each project and contract 
according to the calculation process described in part 4.3. This process produces an 
average IRR for all projects of each data set and for each type of contract. The IRR 
results are shown in Table 3, based on both OCFR and CRR measures. Table 3 shows 
the average IRR for all SMEs and for each sector from the simulation process. The 
first row shows that if the financial performance of SMEs is measured by OCFR and 
the financing is provided through a murabaha contract, it will produce an average 
IRR of 14.5% per annum, while if the financing is provided through a musharaka 
contract, it will produce an average IRR of 19.3%. Meanwhile, if the financing is 
provided through a convertible ijarah contracts, it will produce an average IRR of 
18.0%. The convertible ijarah contract does not produce the highest average IRR 
but rather slightly lower than the average IRR that is produced by a musharaka 
contract. However, the standard deviation figures are quite interesting.  Financing 
through musharaka contracts involves the highest risk, with a standard deviation 
of 15.8%; while financing through murabaha contracts involves the lowest risk, 
with a standard deviation of 3.4%; and, finally, financing through convertible 
ijarah contracts involves quite a low risk, with a standard deviation of 6.7%. 
Table 3.
The Average IRR of Each Sector for Each Contract Scenario
No Sectors
Short Term Financial Performance (OCFR) Long Term Financial Performance (CRR)
Margin 
Based 
Contract (M)
Musharaka 
Contract (S)
Convertible 
Ijarah 
Contract(K)
Margin 
Based 
Contract (M)
Musharaka 
Contract (S)
Convertible 
Ijarah 
Contract(K)
Avr 
(%)
SD
Avr 
(%)
SD
Avr 
(%)
SD
Avr 
(%)
SD
Avr 
(%)
SD
Avr 
(%)
SD
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
1 All Data 14.5 3.4 19.3 15.8 18 6.7 11.2 6.8 8.7 19 13.2 9.1
2 Farming 13.4 5.1 14.1 12.3 15.3 6.5 8.6 7.6 2.6 17.6 9.7 8.9
3 Mining 14 4.2 31 22.5 22.2 9.8 11.5 6.6 13.9 20.6 14.9 9.7
4 Industry 14.6 3.2 18.5 10.9 17.3 5 12.1 6.3 15.4 19.5 15.5 9.3
5 Utility 13.6 4.8 13.4 10.7 15.2 5.8 9.2 7.5 5.6 22.1 11.3 10
6 Construction 15 2 22.9 16.5 19.5 6.5 10.6 7 10.1 20.4 13.2 9.6
7 Commerce 14.4 3.6 19.8 12.8 17.8 5.9 11.6 6.5 10.3 15 13.3 8.1
8 Trans. & Comm. 13.8 4.6 22.4 17.4 18.7 8.1 11.6 6.5 12.6 17.7 14.2 8.9
9 Business Services 14.6 3.2 14.2 14.5 16.8 5.8 9 7.5 2.8 20.3 10.4 9.5
10 Social Services 13.5 4.9 15.6 13.3 15.9 6.7 9.9 7.3 5.6 15.1 11 8.4
The second column of Table 3 shows similar figures, but the financial 
performance of SMEs is measured by a long-term measure of financial performance 
– cash recovery rate (CRR). In general, the IRR from any type of the contract 
is lower than other IRR if the financial performance of projects is measured by 
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OCFR, while the risk or standard deviation looks higher. The first row shows that 
the average IRR (for all SME data) from a murabaha contract is 11.2%, compared to 
14.5% of the average IRR from the same type of contract with the OCFR measure; 
while the average IRR from a musharaka contract is 8.7% (compared to 19.3%); and 
the average IRR from a convertible ijarah contract is 13.2% (compared to 18.0%). 
However, the standard deviation from each type of contract is 6.8% (compared 
to 3.4%) for a murabaha contract, 19.0% (compared to 15.5%) for a musharaka 
contract, and 9.1% (compared to 6.7%) for a convertible ijarah contract. The IRR 
and standard deviation figures for each of the nine sectors are displayed in the 
following rows. 
The last part of the discussion relates to how a convertible ijarah contract 
would perform better compared to a murabaha contract and compared to a 
musharaka contract. Using t-tests, we examine whether (a) the IRR from a 
convertible ijarah contract minus the IRR from a direct PLS contract (i.e., IRR(K)-
IRR(S)) is significantly higher than zero and (b) whether the IRR from a convertible 
ijarah contract minus the IRR from a murabaha contract (i.e., IRR(K)-IRR(M)) is 
significantly higher than zero. At-test is conducted for every data set of 10,000 data 
points. The summary of the t-test is shown in Table 4.
Table 4.
Performance of Convertible Ijarah Contract Compared to Other Contracts
No Sectors
Short term Financial Performance 
(OCFR)
Long term Financial Performance (CRR)
IRR(K)-IRR (S) IRR(K)-IRR (M) IRR(K)-IRR (S) IRR(K)-IRR (M)
Average 
(%)
t test
(p value)
Average 
(%)
t test
(p value)
Average 
(%)
t test
(p value)
Average 
(%)
t test
(p value)
1 All Data -1.31 0 3.54 0 4.51 0 2.05 0
2 Farming 1.21 0 1.96 0 7.07 0 1.08 0
3 Mining -8.79 0 8.23 0 0.92 0 3.33 0
4 Industry -1.18 0 2.76 0 0.09 0.662 3.46 0
5 Utility 1.8 0 1.53 0 5.7 0 2.14 0
6 Construction -3.37 0 4.51 0 3.1 0 2.56 0
7 Commerce -1.99 0 3.44 0 2.99 0 1.72 0
8 Transp  &  Comm -3.71 0 4.9 0 1.6 0 2.6 0
9 Business Services 2.63 0 2.25 0 7.64 0 1.36 0
10 Social Services 0.32 0.005 2.44 0.005 5.39 0 1.07 0
The first row of Table 4 shows that the IRR of a convertible ijarah contract is 
significantly (1.31%) lower compared to the IRR of a musharaka contract, while 
the IRR of a convertible ijarah contract is significantly (3.54%) higher compared to 
the IRR of a murabaha contract. The following rows present the figures for each of 
the SMEs sectors. These figures show that, for several sectors (e.g., farming, utility, 
business services and social services), financing though a musharaka contract will 
produce higher IRR than financing through a convertible ijarah contract, while 
financing for other sectors (e.g., mining, industry, construction, commerce, and 
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transportation & communication) will be better off when employing a convertible 
ijarah contract. However, financing through a convertible ijarah contract will 
always outperform financing through a murabaha contract.
The above conditions are conditional to how financial performance is measured 
(i.e., by OCFR). When the financial performance is measured by CRR, the next 
column of Table 4 presents a more conclusive figure. This part shows that, for all 
SME data, the IRR of a convertible ijarah contract is significantly (4.51%) higher 
than the IRR of a musharaka contract and significantly (2.05%) higher than the 
IRR of a murabaha contract. The following rows also show similar figures, except 
for the industry sector. In the industry sector, there is no difference between the 
IRR from a convertible ijarah contract and the IRR from a musharaka contract. We 
conclude that when SME’s financial performance is measured by CRR, an Islamic 
financier firm will generate a higher return by providing financing through 
a convertible ijarah contract compared to a murabaha contract or a musharaka 
contract, for almost all sectors. 
V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
5.1. Conclusion 
In this study, we analyze the economic feasibility of a convertible ijarah contract to 
be used by Islamic financial institutions to provide PLS or equity-based financing, 
because this type of financing is more suitable to Islamic finance ideas. Specifically, 
here we examined whether a convertible ijarah contract will result in a higher 
return (measured by internal rate of return, or IRR) for Islamic financiers compared 
to a murabaha contract and compared to a direct musharaka contract. This study 
was conducted using a simulation method assuming each project is financed 
using three contract scenarios: a murabaha (cost plus financing as a margin-based 
contract), a direct musharaka (as profit and loss sharing or equity participation 
contract), and a convertible ijarah contract, as proposed here. We used financial 
performance of Indonesian SMEs as the main input for the simulation. We found 
that when the financial performance of SMEs is measured by short-term operating 
performance –that is, operating cash flow rate (OCFR) – the IRR from convertible 
ijarah contract does not outperform the IRR of a direct PLS contract, except for 
low-margin sectors like farming and utility sectors.  However, when the financial 
performance of SMEs is measured by long-term economic performance – that is, 
cash recovery rate (CRR) – we found that IRR from a convertible ijarah contract 
outperforms a margin-based contract and outperforms a direct PLS contract for 
almost all sectors.  
5.2. Recommendation
Based on results of this study, we provide recommendations for practitioners, 
regulator and academicians. For practitioners, while a convertible ijarah contract 
might be most suited for Islamic venture capital, we also suggest that Islamic 
financial institutions should consider the convertible ijarah contract to increase 
their PLS-based financing to increase their profitability. This contract provides a 
greater opportunity for Islamic financial institutions to collect any soft information 
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regarding the project and the entrepreneur, thus reducing the adverse selection 
problem before provide financing based on a profit and loss sharing scheme. For 
academician, this study hopefully become early research to consider convertible 
ijarah contracts to increase PLS-based financing. Muslim countries need to 
increase PLS-based financing in order to accelerate their technological innovation 
and entrepreneurship for long-term economic development and to increase the 
equality of income distribution in the society. For Bank Indonesia as regulator, this 
study intent to provide an innovation to provide financing for SME’s in Indonesia, 
especially to achieve minimum 20 percent of SME’s financing as stated in Bank 
Indonesia Regulation no. 14/22/PBI/2012. However, for regulators, a thorough 
discussion is needed to determine whether this contract will be able to comply 
with Sharia principles before implementation.
Last, we admit that the main data source for this study was limited to financial 
reports of Indonesian SMEs during 2004-2010. The difficulty in gathering data 
means that this study might not be able to capture the recent figures of the economic 
performance of Indonesian SMEs. Further research should use more recent data 
to overcome this limitation and to describe the possible dynamics of Indonesian 
SMEs’ performance. Moreover, this study was conducted by simulation method, 
meaning that the result would be sensitive to assumptions of the model. A more 
mathematical modeling with a closed solution might be needed to enrich the 
conclusion regarding the convertible ijarah contract model. 
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